The Need for U.S. Restraint in Ukraine
Actions speak louder than words. While most Western leaders have been careful about what they say regarding direct war with Russia (although more recently, not so much), almost all of them have decided to send weapons, munitions, and a vast array of armaments and training forces to Ukraine.
This acceleration into another proxy, or Cold War, is a mistake which would put America in a much worse position than it is already in today. It does not matter that the West believes NATO is only a defensive alliance that serves American interests. What matters more is how does Putin perceive this alliance? If Russia’s definition of an entity is different from the West’s definition of that same entity, then policy must be conformed as necessary so that it plays out to a best-case scenario for American interests.
A larger European war is not in the interest of the United States. It may be the case, however, that it is in Putin’s best interest, and that will become more true the further he is isolated politically and economically. It would be prudent to not fall for the bait and to therefore ensure that American interests are pursued, as opposed to fleeting sentiments of politics, or any illusionary sense of ideological exceptionalism.
Writing during World War II, all the way back in 1943, Walter Lippmann begins his chapter on American-Russian relations in his pocketbook published for the American war effort, entitled U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, with the statement that “We have taken it for granted that we must discover the true American national interest… and if… we fail to find it correctly and to explore its implication exhaustively, our policies will be unworkable in practice because in fact they do not recognize the realities of our position.”
Lippmann continues to say that “the story of Russian-American relations is an impressive demonstration of how unimportant in the determination of policy is ideology, how compelling is national interest.” In this sense, it does not matter what we, as Americans, think about the type of government that Vladimir Putin leads and embodies in Russia today. We make no such complaints of our friends in Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, or elsewhere. It is of course imperative that we remain a staunch supporter of human rights wherever and whenever we can. But first and foremost, American values need to be protected at home before we can police the globe. America has had many such projects since the time of Lippmann’s writing, and they have mostly all failed and backfired spectacularly.
There have been various explanations given for Putin’s war in Ukraine. Some say he was threatened by NATO’s expansion into his backyard. Others say that Putin would have done this regardless, and that this war is merely justifying the existence of NATO. States like Sweden and Finland are currently speaking of joining the alliance, which is further being used by NATO advocates to justify its mission. So America must then ask itself: are these developments in America’s best interest? Russia has since already threatened to deploy nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles if these two states join NATO. Of course, this may just be bluster. But would it be prudent to find out if that is the case?
Before we go down a route that is not in our own interests, it would be important to recall what Lippmann had to say nearly eighty years ago. It is imperative that the United States, first and foremost, does not do more that leads to a larger war. There are signs that Moldova is now being caught up into what already may be a larger war. Acting in a way that leads to further risks in Scandinavia or the Baltic states would not be wise. This is not merely an attempt to lay blame only at the feet of the West. It is, however, a reminder that once war accelerates, that control of it is quickly lost by whomever used to be holding the cards.
Nicholas Spykman wrote his preeminent article entitled The Geography of the Peace in 1944, only one year after Lippmann. He similarly writes that “Russia… will be the strongest land power on the continent and it will be to the advantage of both Britain and the United States to have her as an ally… The three super-powers together will, therefore, be the only effective guarantors of the European situation.” Writing near the end of World War II, Spykman was convinced that the US, UK, and Russia must remain allies if there is to be lasting peace in Europe.
Spykman concludes his piece by saying that “the United States must recognize once again, and permanently, that the power constellation in Europe and Asia is of everlasting concern to her, both in time of war and in time of peace.” He continues:
today, we are looking forward to a new peace after the Second World War. The basic issues will remain the same because the geographic factors continue to operate. Balanced power on the Eurasian Continent is one of the objectives for which we are fighting and the establishment of such an equilibrium and its preservation will be our objective when the fight is won… The other two great powers in the world, Russia and Great Britain, will also find their security threatened by the establishment of any hegemony in Europe and Asia. These three states can, therefore, provide the foundation for an effective security system. Since neither of the three can afford to stand alone and isolated against the rest of the world, their co-operation will serve their own best interests.
One can argue whether it still holds true today that the cooperation of the US, UK, and Russia are required for peace in Europe and Asia, and one can also argue about whether it is true that the cooperation of these three states serves each of their own interests. But no matter what argument is put forward in these regards, Putin himself has said, “we don’t intend to be isolated. It is impossible to severely isolate anyone in the modern world – especially such a vast country as Russia.”
Putin said this in response to increasingly restrictive economic sanctions put on Russia by the West. Some argue that the West should continue to pile on as many economic sanctions as possible – that once the world has completely degraded the Russia economy, that Putin will be forced to end the war, either because he is out of resources or because of domestic unrest at home. This plan of action completely misreads the situation. As Lippmann and Spykman argued nearly eighty years ago, it is in American interests to at least ensure that a direct conflict does not break out with Russia if there is to be peace on the Eurasian continent and between the opposing anchors of the globe.
Writing a little bit later in 1954, Kenneth Waltz states a fact of international relations that cannot be forgotten today when deciding upon a wise American foreign policy with regards to Russia:
“States have many objects. Some states may aim at the conquest of the world, other states may aim at a local hegemony, other states may aim at no hegemony at all but desire simply to be left alone. Common to the desires of all states is the wish for survival… If all states wanted simply to survive, then none would need to maintain military forces for use in either defensive or offensive action. But whenever some states give the impression that survival does not exhaust their political ambitions, others are forced, logically, to look to their defenses.”
Waltz’s statement can, of course, cut in either direction. What is Putin aiming at, and maybe more importantly, what does Putin think NATO and the West are aiming at? It becomes difficult to untangle all the threads that constitute the answers to these questions. However, the ball of yarn, even with all threads hopelessly tangled, must still be put in a position that serves American interests.
American interests are not in fighting, directly or indirectly, wars with Russia, nor are they in the degradation of Russia’s state power. Russia may not be a direct ally, but it is still in American interests to ensure that Russia at least remains a balancing anchor on the other side of the globe. If the West is successful in these goals, a degraded Russia only means China will take its place as the hegemon in the East (if it has not already), and other like-minded states will only double, or triple, their efforts into totalitarian and nuclear-armed regimes in attempts to prevent what they have had witnessed happening to Russia.
American interests call for an Eastern hemisphere which does not feel the need for this course of action. Fighting another Cold War and degrading Russia’s state power might serve immediate American interests, but the vacuum that would be created, and the forces which would fill it, would be much worse for American interests. Pursuing a strategy of Russian degradation and an escalation of conflict is short-sighted and will only meet American interests in the immediate short-term but will be a greater danger to America beyond that.